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Abstract 
 
The New Labour government has arguably broken new ground by making 
„masculinity policy‟. Whereas the policy process is always inevitably 
gendered, with implications for men as well as women, it is only in the last few 
years that a government has made quite such explicit references to men in 
some areas of policy. The most high profile initiatives have been in relation to 
fathering and to the education of boys. In this paper we make out a case that 
New Labour proceeds with policy optimism about men in the home and 
pessimism about men outside the home. In contrast, there has been policy 
pessimism about women in the home and optimism about women outside the 
home. Where New Labour is optimistic, it tends to produce policies that are 
encouraging and facilitative, and where New Labour is pessimistic, it can 
produce policies that are authoritarian. 
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The politics of New Labour have been analysed from various perspectives, 
including discourses of exclusion and inclusion (Levitas, 1998), the language 
of „spin‟ (Fairclough, 2000) and the ideology of social policy (Powell, 1999). 
This paper aims to analyse New Labour policies from a gender perspective, 
and specifically to draw attention to a new development – the making of policy 
on masculinity. Lister (2000) has provided an overview of what a gender 
analysis has brought to social policy. She lists six questions that are prompted 
by a gendered analysis of social policy. These are as follows: who stands to 
gain from welfare practices? what are the effects on gender relations of 
particular social policies? who are the actors in the development and 
execution of policies? how does the relationship between public and private 
affect women and men‟s positions? how are resources distributed? and what 
are the gendered meanings of the key concepts used in social policy 
analysis? This paper attempts to address all six to varying degrees, in raising 
some initial observations about New Labour and masculinity.  
Gender analyses of social policy have, until recently, focused on the 
effects of policy on women, but we are beginning to see reflection on men in 
social policy, most notably the collection from Popay et al (1998). In that 
collection Hearn (1998) writes that masculinity is now „just about‟ on the policy 
agenda. We argue in this paper that it is now firmly on the policy agenda. For 
the first time, a government is consciously addressing, in relation to specific 
social problems, the issue of how society deals with men, what it expects of 
men and how men should behave. This is not to suggest that particular 
strands in policy-making did not previously identify men as a specific target. 
Criminal justice discourse, for example, has long concentrated upon the 
„problem‟ of boys. The tone may change, but a chain of gender-centred 
concern does link Baden-Powell‟s plans for the Hooligan (see Pearson 1983), 
and the list which Macdonald (1995) provides of the bogeymen of the Major 
era – „squatter, the Raver, the New Age traveller, the dole fiddler, the 
inhabitants of the “yob culture”, the lager lout….the bail bandit and the 
persistent young offender‟. 
The difference between these previous concerns and the approach of 
New Labour is the pervasive way in which gender considerations, and a 
concern with masculinity in particular, can be found across a far wider social 
policy canvass.  Several important questions are raised by this new interest in 
policy for/about men: what does this trend signify? why now? what has been 
the impact of policies? how do government rhetoric and policy initiatives fit 
into what Messner (1997) calls the „terrain of the politics of masculinities‟?  
The Home Office has led the more general policy development in 
relation to men. In 1998 a Ministerial Seminar on „Boys, young men and 
fathers‟ took place, that mapped out some key areas of concern (Home 
Office, 1998a). There were sessions during this on bringing up boys, young 
men in public space, fatherhood, preventing offending in young men, street 
homelessness, and the mental health of boys and young men. Across 
government, we have seen the social construction of masculinity consciously 
raised in relation to several public policy issues, including the under-
achievement of boys in schools, fatherhood, health, youth crime and suicide. 
There is varying emphasis on masculinity, however, between government 
departments and between parts of the United Kingdom, as discussed in a 
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later section of this article. This paper has two main aims. Firstly, we believe 
the fact that New Labour is making policy on masculinity is worth asserting, as 
it is a new observation in the social policy literature (although see 
Featherstone and Trinder, 2001). Secondly, we aim to discuss the 
implications of some of New Labour‟s social policy for men and women. We 
begin by introducing the topic of masculinity as a social problem. 
 
 
Masculinity as a social problem 
 
Collier (1998) and Connell (2000), amongst others, remind us that in relation 
to a range of issues, including crime, parenting, working with children, child 
support, sexuality, marriage and divorce, the behaviour of men has been 
called into question in media, academic and political discourse across the 
Western world. The fact that the topic of masculinity seems to be considered 
„good copy‟ in much of the media, and not just in the intellectual press, is an 
indication of its currency and accessibility. Whilst the „problem of men‟ is not a 
unitary discourse, and does not arise from a homogenous set of concerns, but 
comes from several different directions and focuses on a variety of 
behaviours, it is possible to outline two fundamentally different approaches 
that define this social problem. This distinction is rather crude, but may be of 
some use to people in navigating this increasingly complex terrain of 
masculinity discourse. The two approaches are men as perpetrators and men 
as victims. According to the first approach, men are a source of danger and 
disorder, an anti-social influence. There is, here, an emphasis on the 
privileges of masculinity (Messner, 1997). According to the second approach 
men are facing greater disadvantage in society than women. It is men who 
are the „unprotected sex‟ to cite the title of Patrick Jones‟s recent play. Here 
the emphasis is on the costs of masculinity (Messner, 1997).  
 The dominant notion in the mainstream media seems to be that of the 
„crisis of masculinity‟. Some recent and widely disseminated examples of 
popular academic writings that rely on this notion are Faludi (1999) and Clare 
(2000). Typically, this crisis discourse draws on both approaches outlined 
above, in that men are described as exhibiting anti-social and destructive 
behaviour, but that this is in response to insecurity about their „role‟. In 
general, there is a fairly heavy emphasis within this discourse on the costs of 
masculinity. Ros Coward (1999), a journalist with a feminist heritage, goes as 
far as to claim that it is men that are now the primary victims of the gender 
order, rather than women. It was widely publicised that Doris Lessing made 
the same claim at the 2001 Edinburgh Festival (see, for example, Gibbons, 
2001). 
In discussing the ways in which masculinity is constructed as a social 
problem, we have to address the ontological question of whether masculinity 
is really a problem. The writings of Kitsuse and Spector (1973) have shown us 
we should pay attention to how claims are made about the extent to which 
social phenomena constitute social problems, and about the relative 
importance of social problems. This view has in turn been criticised as, 
amongst other things, deflecting attention away from action to alleviate social 
problems. A contextual constructionist approach (Best, 1989), however, 
allows for both the examination of how social phenomena come to be seen as 
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social problems and also for an acceptance that material reality (in this case 
what men are really like) will affect the construction of social problems. Such 
an approach is the most useful to our topic. The process whereby issues 
become social problems involves mediation of concerns by media, academia, 
government, and street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky, 1980). Our paper will 
concentrate on the construction of masculinity as a social problem within the 
government of New Labour. 
 
 
 
The public and the private  
 
As Lister (2000) observes, traditionally the social policy discipline has seen 
the relationship between the public and the private in terms of the relationship 
between the state and the market. Feminism has challenged these limited 
definitions, and opened up an analysis of the private, domestic sphere, the 
traditional realm of women. Our discussion of New Labour politics follows this 
feminist distinction between what goes on outside the home (the public 
sphere) and what goes on inside the home (the private). Bailey (2000) has 
recently challenged this distinction, along with several other taken-for-granted 
distinctions between public and private. He argues that identifying the family 
as the most significant private realm constrains the extensiveness of our 
conception of the private. Also, it is important to note that Fairclough argues 
the feminist public-private distinction is challenged by New Labour‟s social 
authoritarianism: 
 
Blair represents the family as sort of public space – he constructs 
the family through a discourse that is more usually applied to public 
institutions such as schools, representing family life in a formal and 
distanced way by emptying it of its intimacy through applying to it 
public categories such as „mutual respect‟ and „acceptable conduct‟ 
(Fairclough, 2000: 43). 
 
In the light of conceptual problems of the public/private labels, we are using 
the headings of „in the home‟ and „outside the home‟. Our argument is, in 
short, that we can see in the politics of New Labour a policy optimism about 
men inside the home, and a policy pessimism about men outside, whereas, in 
contrast, there is pessimism about women inside the home, and optimism 
about women outside. We further argue that optimism and pessimism tend to 
lead to different sorts of policy responses. Where New Labour is optimistic, it 
tends to produce policies that are encouraging and facilitative. This is true of 
those policies that are designed to assist men as fathers and women as public 
figures. Where New Labour is pessimistic, it can produce policies that are 
authoritarian. This is true of its use of criminal justice measures to deal with 
essentially social policy problems - police powers to round up truants, for 
example. 
 
 
Men in the home 
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Fiona Williams (1998) has identified concerns about both father absence and 
father distance in contemporary social policy discourse on fatherhood. She 
notes that concern with father distance has been expressed both by those 
who see the problem as one of men being denied opportunities to be closely 
involved with their children (Burgess and Ruxton, 1990) and also by those 
who see the problem as men‟s avoidance of responsibilities (Campbell, 1993). 
We agree with Featherstone and Trinder (2001) that New Labour is generally 
positive about fathers, and we see government policies broadly sympathetic 
with Burgess and Ruxton‟s (1990) arguments about the need to remove 
institutional barriers to men spending more time with their children. In terms of 
Messner‟s (1997) terrain of the politics of masculinities, New Labour policies 
on fatherhood are therefore more focused on the costs of masculinity than on 
its privileges. 
 There have been several statements from ministers about what they 
see as the crucial importance of fathers to the well-being of children, and boys 
especially. Paul Boateng, then Home Office Minister, made this point strongly 
in the Ministerial Seminar (Home Office, 1998a) as did Jane Kennedy, then 
Parliamentary Secretary for the Lord Chancellor‟s Department at a London 
conference on services for fathers (Kennedy, 1999). Ministers tend to refer to 
unspecified „research‟ in support of this argument, despite the fact that 
research evidence on the effects of father absence on children is at the very 
least equivocal (Featherstone, 2000) if not spurious (Connell, 2000). We do 
not concur, however, with Johnson‟s (1999: 98) claim that „New Labour‟s 
emphasis on the family is… virtually indistinguishable from the conservative 
policies in this area‟. New Labour has certainly struck a more positive note in 
relation to involving fathers in the care of children than the previous 
administration, which will chiefly be remembered for its emphasis on the 
solely economic obligations of fathers through its setting up of the Child 
Support Agency. 
It is also important to note Featherstone‟s (2000) observation that the 
emphasis on fathers varies across departments. As might have been 
anticipated, given the lengthy tradition identified earlier, the Home Office has 
led the way, with the Green Paper on the family, Supporting Families, for 
example, making conscious reference to „the needs of young men and the 
support available to fathers‟ (Home Office, 1998b: 48). This department has 
also funded fathers‟ projects under its family support grant. This is relatively 
small funding compared to other types of social spending, but it is significant 
that a government considers it important to spend on projects specifically 
geared towards helping fathers. There is little evidence yet about the 
ideological orientation of these funded fathers‟ projects. However, the 
overriding impression from the 1999 London conference „Developing Effective 
Services for Fathers‟, organised by some of the funded organisations, was of 
the need to make societal attitudes to fathers more positive, with the 
implication that it is not fathers themselves whose behaviour is the problem, 
but rather some other groups – social workers perhaps, or even women. As 
far as other government departments are concerned, Sure Start is the most 
generous of New Labour developments in family policy, and although the 
„spin‟ on the first batch of programmes funded in England made some specific 
mention of interventions geared towards fathers, the initiative overall is 
arguably focused largely on mothers and children. 
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The New Labour government has made family friendly work policies a 
priority, in the form of the Parental Leave Directive, Working Time Directive 
and Part-time work Directive. Lewis (1992) has observed that Britain has a 
strong male breadwinner tradition compared to other European welfare states. 
Because of the initial lack of financial backing to these new measures, there 
has been no significant overall shift to men spending more time in the home. 
What is interesting from the point of view of the politics of masculinity is again 
the optimistic view of fathering on which the policies are based. There is an 
assumption that British men want to spend more time with their children and 
less in work, an assumption that may not be borne out. The Government is 
keen to stress the evidence we have for men‟s desire to move from work to 
home (Department of Education and Employment, 2000a), but this use of 
research is again very selective, and indicates the optimistic assumptions that 
underpin New Labour family policy. This optimism about men is also reflected 
in Third Way thinking. Giddens (1998) describes the „democratic family‟, 
which is based on a gender equality men are keen to embrace. 
Featherstone (2000) concludes that the setting up of fathers as 
solutions to social problems denies both the complexities of men‟s lives and 
the dangers that some men can pose in families. There are indications that 
men who are the cause of family problems are seen as outside of the realm of 
fathering described by Home Office Ministers. There is also little conception 
that such men can change (see Bright and Ryle, 2000). Wife beaters and sex 
offenders are constructed as non-fathers. Both the policy optimism and policy 
pessimism approach of New Labour gloss over some important facts. Sexual 
crimes are presented as the work of men outside the home and therefore are 
treated with pessimism and authoritarian policies, although we know that 
sexual abuse is much more likely to occur within the home than outside it. 
 
 
Women in the home 
 
The primary focus of this paper is upon men as objects of New Labour policy-
making. However, there are connections with policies which are focused upon 
women and whilst these warrant a paper in their own right (for a thorough 
recent analysis see Rake, 2001) we need, very briefly, to touch upon these. 
Essentially, the argument put forward here is that if New Labour takes a 
policy-optimistic view of men within the home, its approach to women has 
been the opposite. The dominant emphasis here has been upon the problem 
of women remaining unreasonably at home at the tax-payer‟s expense and, 
as New Labour would argue, at the expense of their own long-term economic 
prospects. The first term of the Blair administration has developed a policy 
approach of creeping compulsion in support of this essentially ideological 
position. Early New Deal arrangements for lone parents, for example, were 
surrounded by Ministerial protestations about the voluntary nature of any 
participation. By the end of the period, that voluntarism was under severe 
strain, with engagement in the scheme based on requirement rather than 
encouragement. The Budget of March 2001 altered the rules for lone parent 
benefit claimants. The Treasury Press Release explained the change in this 
way: 
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from April 2002, all lone parents on Income Support will be required 
to attend work-focused interviews and an additional interview will 
be introduced at the six-month stage in the Income Support claim 
(HM Treasury 2001). 
 
In relation to child-bearing itself, it could be argued, New Labour developed a 
progressive record in some respects, extending maternity allowances and 
maternity leave. Once child-bearing was over, however, New Labour prefers 
to see women move rapidly out of the home and into the workplace. Yet, at 
the same time as promoting the participation of women in the workforce, the 
Blair government also developed a formidable set of expectations of women-
as-parents. Here, too, in the terms adopted in this paper, the policy approach 
was essentially authoritarian rather than facilitative. Parents are problem 
people for New Labour, needing to be shaped-up to meet their responsibilities 
in education, health and conduct.  
On 23rd March 2001, for example, speaking to the Secondary Heads 
Association, David Blunkett (Education Secretary at the time) said he planned 
„to be tough on parents who are abusive, obstructive or who won‟t take 
responsibility for their children‟s behaviour‟ (Department for Education and 
Employment, 2001). It is no surprise, perhaps, to find policy announcements 
being made through the Home Office, rather than the Department of 
Education, as in the April 2000 when the then Schools Minister Jacqui Smith 
was quoted in support of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Bill, by 
saying: 
 
We must crack down on truancy. Evidence shows that truants are 
more likely to drift into crime, be unemployed and earn less than 
children who attend school regularly. 
Under the Bill parents of persistent truants would face 
increased fines of up to £5,000 and, unlike the present position, 
would have to attend court or face arrest. Irresponsible parents 
who fail to do enough to ensure their children get a good education 
would have to face up to their responsibilities (Home Office, 
2000a). 
 
The point we wish to make is that, in practice, the burden of official 
disapproval in these matters is carried by mothers. While governments may 
talk of „parents‟, the impact of policies to impose home-school agreements, 
fine the parents of truants or require the parents of children appearing before 
the Courts to attend parenting classes falls quite disproportionately upon 
mothers, not fathers. In research conducted by one of the authors, for 
example, mothers were held responsible for the behaviour of their children by 
the Courts, even on those rare occasions when fathers were also present 
(Drakeford, 1996). Even where the emphasis is on counselling and advice, as 
with the National Family and Parenting Institute and Parentline, it could be 
argued that policy solutions are targeted at the individual parent (more often 
mother in practice) and that therefore 
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the issue of how structural changes in British society may have 
contributed to increases in criminal behaviour or inequality in 
educational achievement is obfuscated (Rake, 2001: 225). 
 
The examples above refer to pessimistic policies on parenting that have a 
greater impact on women because of the gendered division of child care and 
the attitudes of officials such as sentencers. There is less evidence of 
pessimistic policy being specifically directed at women. There is one example 
worth mentioning in this regard, however. The Sure Start Maternity Grant 
replaced the Social Fund Maternity Payment. This one-off payment to women 
doubled in value following the change, but became dependent on evidence 
that the recipient has been advised by a health professional on child health 
and welfare. It is an example of the coercion of poor women specifically. 
 
 
Men outside the home 
 
In this section of the paper we move on to discuss the politics of New Labour 
in relation to men in the public sphere. Particularly relevant here is the 
attention paid to boys failing in schools, and men‟s ill health and crime, as well 
as the less consciously masculinised area of employment policy. 
 New Labour is concerned with health inequalities in ways that 
Thatcher‟s and Major‟s administration were not. There has been some 
attempt to combine gender and class dimensions in tackling men‟s ill health. 
The Department of Health has been keen to stress that life expectancy for 
men in the highest social classes is 5 years more than men in the lowest 
social classes (Department of Health, 1998a). Of course governmental 
attention to men‟s health can be seen as pro-men in as much as the aim is 
improved longevity and quality of life for men. The rhetoric is, however, at 
times one of blame, with the implication that working class men are 
themselves responsible for social inequalities in health. Tessa Jowell (then 
Minister for Public Health) stated in 1998 that 
 
The culture of heavy drinking, heavy smoking and eating too much 
fatty food inevitably leads to health problems……We are working to 
improve things, through the Social Exclusion Unit, and a co-
ordinated approach across Government, but there is a shared 
responsibility and every individual can do something to help 
themselves (Department of Health, 1998b) 
 
The Department of Health (1998) booklet, Life Begins at 40, subtitled 
Health tips for men, for example, was launched at Langham Club, a working 
men‟s club in North London and circulated through rugby clubs, sports clubs 
and other working men‟s outlets. The tips included information on smoking, 
stress and exercise and other advice to help „men think harder about how 
they live their lives.‟ 
The most clearly masculinised of all New Labour policies is of course the 
focus on the supposed under-achievement of boys. There could be debate 
about which policies reinforce particular models of masculinity, but we mean 
masculinised here in the sense that men are named as men. Gender and 
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achievement is a contested policy issue. In particular, some feminists have 
characterised a concern with boys‟ performance as „oh, you mean they‟re not 
doing better than girls any more, like they should‟ (quoted in Epstein et al., 
1998) and have rejected the claim that boys are underachieving (e.g. 
Delamont, 2000; see also Gorard et al, 1999). There are tensions evident in 
New Labour‟s approach to the issue. On the one hand the attack on „laddish‟ 
culture could be seen as an attack on masculinity‟s privilege of irresponsibility. 
However, the concern with intervening to boost boys‟ performance could also 
be seen a shoring up of male dominance, when seen in the context of the 
recent history of girls being seen as the under-achievers, and men‟s 
continuing dominance in so much social and economic life across the globe 
(Connell, 2000). 
 The mainstream solutions proposed to boys‟ „underachievement‟ are 
certainly not going to challenge the presumption of dominance. Former 
Education Secretary David Blunkett was quoted (in Roberts, 2000) as saying 
there is a danger of resentment about the „aggressive assertiveness‟ of equal 
opportunities for women. He has proposed that boys needed „better male role 
models‟ inside and outside school, pointing to primary and nursery schools, 
where 83% of teachers are women (Woodward, 2000). In the same article, he 
also offers, as proof of action being taken, the changing of primary school 
reading lists to make books more stimulating for boys, and the use of 
professional footballers to help promote after-school study centres. The 
Department of Education and Employment‟s „Gender and Achievement‟ 
website uses as an example of good practice the „Boys‟ Literacy‟ project at 
Sunnymede Junior School. This project created a „boyzone‟ of books on 
„boy‟s themes‟ and when choosing men to speak to „Dad‟s assemblies‟, chose 
a police officer and businessman. In none of these interventions are either the 
masculinities that might underpin an anti-learning culture or those that 
assume a right to dominate girls being questioned. There has been some very 
interesting work done on offering alternative non-macho models of masculinity 
to boys in school (e.g. Salisbury and Jackson, 1996), but these approaches 
do not feature strongly in the government‟s gender and education policies. 
 Another important issue to consider in an overview of men outside the 
home is the new emphasis on gender in relation to anti-social and criminal 
behaviour. It was this concern with the damaging behaviour of young men that 
was the most significant reason for the Home Office to sponsor a seminar on 
masculinity in 1998. Arguments such as those of Bea Campbell (1993) about 
lawless masculinity in troubled estates have to some extent become 
mainstream in the politics of New Labour. Campbell argued, with reference to 
riots on several estates around Britain in the Summer of 1990, that social 
disorder in poor working class estates is as much if not more to do with 
gender relations as it is to do with class and social exclusion. She paints a 
picture of communities held together by women and torn apart by young men, 
who dominate the public spaces and attack the very community infrastructure 
that the women have helped establish. As Hearn (1998) points out, there is 
some continuity in the academic and political discourse about young men and 
crime with older preoccupations with a „dangerous underclass‟, although 
Campbell herself would deny this link in her own work. There is also, 
however, a newer focus on the masculine deficit, that is, the gap between 
what working class young men expect out of life as men and their actual life 
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chances. In many discussions of working class young men, including those in 
New Labour circles (see Home Office, 1998a), there is reference made to the 
„crisis of masculinity‟ idea, namely that working class young men do not know 
what is expected of them any more, especially in the context of the demise of 
manufacturing and other heavy industries. There is little emphasis on 
questioning traditional roles for young men. The idea that sport can help fill 
gaps in young men‟s lives (para 18 of Home Office 1998a) reinforces 
traditional ideas of working class masculinity predicated on competition and 
physicality. The principal solutions proposed by New Labour to the social 
disorder connected with poverty are employment and criminal justice. The 
New Deal is a generous investment aimed at the unemployed, and, according 
to Levitas‟s (1998) critique, unemployed men in particular. The underlying 
assumption is perhaps the traditional one that young men need a job to tame 
them.  
As to criminal justice, New Labour‟s response to the „problem‟ of men 
and crime, and young men in particular, has been straightforwardly 
authoritarian. Here measures of suppression have been presented as 
„welfare‟ (for Mr Blair‟s description of curfews as „child protection‟ see 
Drakeford and Butler, 1999) and access to welfare made subject to 
behavioural compliance (see Butler and Drakeford, 2001). 
Labour‟s criminal justice approach is to be found more widely than 
simply in the sphere of young people. The new post-2001 Home Secretary, 
David Blunkett, was found, within a month of the General Election, declaring 
that „we have no intention of compromising our principles of toughness and 
safety‟ (Blunkett 2001). A gendered authoritarianism permeates the language 
used in this area, as in the announcement of „Tough new measures to clamp 
down on cowboy (sic) car salvage merchants‟ (Home Office, 2000b). Nor is 
New Labour‟s pessimism in relation to men who offend confined to the 
criminal justice sphere. Probation Circular 53/2001 (Home Office, 2001) sets 
out arrangements for four pilot areas, Derbyshire, Hertfordshire, Teesside and 
West Midlands, in which claimants who re-offend will have their benefit 
reduced for four weeks. Income Support recipients will lose between 20 and 
40 per cent of their income. While the provision will be apply to both men and 
women, the preponderance of men on probation caseloads will inevitably lead 
to its application in a gendered way.   
It should not be assumed that New Labour policy pessimism operates 
only at a rhetorical level. Custodial sentences are available only for young 
men aged 15 and 16. The macho language of No More Excuses (Home Office 
1998c) has, predictably, fed through into actual sentencing decisions. By 
October 2001, the Youth Justice Board was reporting a fall in the number of 
recorded offences committed by juveniles in the eight categories most likely to 
attract a custodial sentence from 25,035 to 21,916. Over the same period, 
however, (April 2000 – March 2001) the number of Detention and Training 
Orders imposed by the courts rose from 1,572 in the first quarter, to 1,731 in 
the last quarter (Youth Justice Board, 2001). 
The consequences of this approach are worth a brief consideration. 
Chief Inspector of Prisons (2001) described one Youth Custody Centre, 
Brinsford, as containing „a level of neglect and lack of understanding of the 
needs of young prisoners that was breathtaking‟. Here, young men whose 
previous history was characterised by a degree of social neglect which the 
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Report describes as „frightening‟, were subjected to levels of self-harm, fear 
for safety and bullying which, the Inspector concluded, „puts most of its 
juvenile population at risk…on entry‟. In an astonishing conclusion, he 
suggests that child protection procedures had never been invoked at the 
institution because, the outcomes of such an investigation „would challenge 
the fundamentals of the existing regime‟. 
It should be noted that the pessimism about men outside the home 
does not of course extend to all men in public life. The discourse of „the 
problem of men‟ is class-specific. As mentioned above, concerns about 
unemployed, anti-social and irresponsible men are connected with concerns 
about the „underclass‟. The underclass idea has been articulated in many 
different ways in academic and political discourse. Gallie (1994) has 
summarised these different perspectives as „conservative‟ and „radical‟. The 
conservative approach concentrates on the moral deficit of poor communities, 
and poor people‟s own responsibility for social problems. Bagguley and Mann 
(1992) caricature such an approach as portraying poor working class people 
as „idle thieving bastards‟. To an extent, the concern within Government about 
men in relation to work, crime, health and education is a gender-specific twist 
on conservative underclass theories, combined with feminist critiques of social 
problems that have their origin on the political left. 
 It seems there is negativity towards men outside the home in the 
rhetoric of New Labour, particularly in the blaming of working class young 
men for the wider social problems of crime, bad health and laddish culture. In 
terms of actual policies, there are some areas where New Labour could be 
seen as attempting to shore up traditional working class masculinity based on 
manly work and manly leisure. The New Deal and action on 
underachievement of boys can be seen as a concerted effort to shore up 
young men‟s positions in society, and maintain their social advantage over 
women. There are other areas, criminal justice in particular, where poor 
working class men are encountering overt social control. Whilst there was 
mention of young men as fathers in the Ministerial Seminar, the policy 
priorities in terms of spending on men have been employment and control. To 
a limited extent, within the home New Labour has an optimistic role-
broadening view of men. Outside the home, however, it has a pessimistic 
view that relies upon role-narrowing and a punitive and authoritarian reaction 
to those who stray beyond it. 
 
 
Women outside the home 
 
If New Labour is infested with policy pessimism in relation to working class 
men in public places, it is possible to suggest that, for the 1997 government, a 
woman‟s place was outside the home. An earlier section of the paper (see 
page p11) traced some of the enforcement measures which the Blair 
administration was prepared to take in support of this approach in the 
employment field, an approach which Annesley (2001: 211) suggests had led 
to the paradox of training lone mothers to work as childminders through the 
New Deal: „paid to look after other people‟s children but not supported to care 
for their own at home‟. As Rake (2001) has noted, the National Minimum 
Wage has benefited more low-paid women more than low-paid men. The 
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National Child Care Strategy has also increased access to day care. The 
State Second Pension will give credits for child care, but only until a child is 
aged six, which gives a clear message about the length of time it is thought 
appropriate for women to stay out of the job market. 
In other policy areas it is possible to identify examples of policy-
optimism in relation to women in the public sphere which have been 
successfully achieved during the New Labour period. In politics itself, the 
Labour Party, albeit with ambivalence, set-backs and a not-unblemished 
record, nevertheless remains the political organisation which has taken the 
most effective steps to increase the participation of women. The National 
Assembly for Wales, for example, has a Labour group in which women are a 
majority and a Cabinet in which women outnumber men – the only democratic 
legislature in the world of which this is true. The New Labour period has been 
one in which women‟s occupation of senior public positions has increased. 
Our point is not to suggest that under New Labour women suddenly 
took over the commanding heights of the public world. There have been 
critiques of New Labour‟s failure to actually move large numbers of women 
into the work place. There are still large  parts of policy which have the effect 
of deterring women from paid work, and the spending on the parts of the New 
Deal that benefit men disproportionately has dwarfed spending on, for 
example, the New Deal for Lone Parents (Rake, 2001). We intend, rather, to 
highlight a contrast in terms of policy intentions with the pessimism about 
women in the home. 
It is of course worth considering whether there is a more complex 
agenda at play here. New Labour rhetoric and some policy decisions could be 
evidence of some sort of recognition of gender equality; it could be a positive 
endorsement of supporting the desires of women in relation to paid work. It 
could also be an attempt to reduce welfare budgets and push women on 
benefits into the paid work force, with all the problematic implications that has. 
There is considerable feminist literature on home-work and public-private 
distinctions, which we cannot hope to justice to in this paper. Our aim is to 
provide a contrastive dimension to an initial consideration of New Labour‟s 
responses to the „problem of men‟. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
New Labour responds to the „problem of men‟ in a variety of ways. There are 
policy areas where men/boys have been very overtly named, parenting and 
education being obvious examples. In relation to some other policy issues, 
such as employment, there has been a less explicit gender dimension in 
government documents, but it is widely acknowledged that policy initiatives 
are directed largely towards men. Our overall argument in this paper has been 
that New Labour can be seen as optimistic about men inside the home, and 
pessimistic about men outside whereas, in contrast, there is policy pessimism 
about women inside the home, and policy optimism about women outside. We 
added an important proviso in relation to men in the public sphere that 
although political rhetoric is often negative about men, some actual policies 
could be seen as representing the retrenchment of traditional masculinities 
predicated on social advantage. 
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An interesting question that remains is why the attention to masculinity 
now? The surfacing of conscious masculinity policies is a high profile example 
of the „problem of men‟ discourse in contemporary society that we mentioned 
earlier in the paper. Especially influential has been the „masculine deficit‟ idea. 
This is the notion that socially excluded men, who do not have access to 
respectable masculine resources of social power such as employment, are 
more likely to construct a masculine identity that is anti-social. This idea, with 
nuances, is the basis of the more sophisticated theories of Segal (1990), 
Messerschmidt (1993) and Connell (1995). There are very different options 
open to policy-makers for responding to this perceived masculine deficit. On 
the one hand, there could potentially be an attempt to challenge the 
presumption of dominance. Alternatively measures could be taken to shore up 
the traditional socio-economic base of men‟s privilege. 
 There are indications that many of New Labour‟s policies are more 
inclined towards the latter strategy than the first. This choice also needs to be 
understood in the context of wider discourse on the politics of gender. Mahony 
(1998) argues that the preoccupation with the under-achievement of boys has 
to be seen as part of global preoccupation with the erosion of the men‟s 
power - „what about the boys?‟ as she puts it. There is a view, expressed by 
David Blunkett‟s words on the aggressive assertive of equal opportunities for 
women, that men are suffering post-feminism. This idea is especially applied 
to the labour market, which has changed substantially and moved away from 
manly heavy industry. Epstein et al (1998) call this emphasis on the difficulties 
for men post-feminism the „poor boys‟ discourse. 
 To an extent, New Labour politicians are attempting to mark out a Third 
Way between feminism and men‟s rights, or between men‟s rights and men‟s 
responsibilities. This is difficult to achieve when, as Connell (2000: 149, citing 
Gilbert and Gilbert) observes about the education debate, „the media love to 
turn the issue into a pro-girl or pro-boy (or pro-feminist versus anti-feminist) 
shoot out‟. Paul Boateng, in the Ministerial Seminar on masculinity, tried to 
avoid both describing boys as „the cause of problems within society‟ and also 
„setting young men up against young women, as if the advances which had 
been achieved for young women, and which were to be celebrated, had 
somehow been won at the expense of young men‟ (Home Office, 1998a:1). 
 When we write of New Labour‟s policy-optimism or policy-pessimism 
we do not do so in the naïve belief that these are merely attitudinal positions. 
The temptation to regard them as such, however, is one which New Labour 
proponents deliberately dangle before the observer. They do so in the claim to 
ideological indifference which has been advanced from the earliest days of 
the 1997 government, and rapidly became one of the strongest themes which 
bound the different social welfare ministries of New Labour together. Within 
six months of taking office, for example, the then-housing Minister, Hilary 
Armstrong, in an address to the annual Conference of the National Housing 
Federations told her audience that, „I am not interested in housing ideologies; 
I am interested in what works‟ (DETR 1997). Her colleague at the Department 
of Social Security, Keith Bradley, defended Labour‟s decision to proceed with 
the privatisation of the Benefit Agency Medical Service on that basis that his 
was not a government of „outdated ideology‟ or of „dogmatic views‟ (DSS 
1998). 
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The positive hostility to ideology that these views express does give 
some surface credence to a conclusion that policy approaches are the 
product of simple dispositions. However, the claim to be anti-ideological is, of 
course, a profoundly ideological claim. Beneath the apparent pragmatism of 
„what works‟ lie a series of beliefs about the relationship between the citizen 
and the state, in which government has an obligation to extend opportunity 
and the individual a corresponding obligation to behave in ways which take 
advantage of the opportunities thus advanced. Generosity towards those who 
„play by the rules‟, and retaliation against those who do not, thus has a 
motivating purpose far in excess of simple predilection. The gendered 
skewing of this apportionment of punishment and reward has deeper 
ideological roots still, reaching far into the foundations of the welfare state and 
the gendered assumptions about family and work upon which it was 
constructed. New Labour‟s pessimism and optimism may turn out to be just 
the most recent manifestation of policy-makers‟ visceral belief in the 
malleability of women and the intractability of men.  
 There is clearly a need for further investigation of contemporary public 
policy and masculinity. Our understanding of the effects of New Labour 
policies on masculinity would, for example, be enhanced by empirical 
research on initiatives to improve the underachievement of boys and the 
ideological orientation and outcomes of fathers projects. This paper has only 
sought to raise some possible interpretations of policies and generally to draw 
attention to the high profile of masculinity in the politics of New Labour. 
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